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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MAXINE K. BLACKBURN,
PlaintiffAppellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
No. 16651
TERRELL M. BLACKBURN,
DefendantRespondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Third
District Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding, in
which Plaintiff-Appellant sought judgment for delinquent child
support in the amount of $2,425.00 and in which Defendant
sought to reduce his monthly obligation of child support from
$125 to $100 per month per child.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was heard on July 18, 1979 before the Honorable Dean E. Conder.

At the conclusion of the testimony of

Defendant the trial court entered judgment against Defendant
and in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $2,425 which represented delinquent child support payments due and owing
through April of 1979.

(R., p.

27).

The court also reduced Defendant's obligation from $125
per month per child to $100 per month per child.

CR., P· 27) •
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At the conclusion of the hearing upon the cour t' s own motion the delinquent child support judgment was suspended until
such time as Defendant became delinquent for a period of two
months at which time the suspension would be withdrawn.

(R.,

pp. 2 7- 2 8 : 41- 4 2) •
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks dismissal of the stay granted by the trial
court as to the delinquent payments and seeks attorney's fees
for this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and defendant were married and lived in Tex·
as.

In June of 1971 a divorce decree was entered by the Court

of Domestic Relations of Harris County, Texas.

The decree

stated that Defendant was to pay the sum of $250 per month as
child support.

(R., p. 18).

Defendant failed to meet this obligation and an action was
commenced by Plaintiff in the State of Utah on May 17, 1979 for
the delinquency of $2,425

(R., p. 2).

Defendant filed his answer denying the amount of arrearage
and requesting modification of the monthly child support paymen:
(R.

I

pp. 12-14).
The matter was heard on July 18, 1979 before the Honorat::

Dean E. Con d er.

A Short hearing was held with the defendant

testifying as to his financial status.

The judgment in the

amount of $2, 425 was stipulated to by the parties and the cour:
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ordered a judgment in that amount.

However, the court also upon

its own motion made the following Order:
I'm going to order Mr. Blackburn to pay
$200 per month for the support of the children and suspend the collection on the arrearage as long as he keeps those payments
current.
Now, if you get behind, Mr. Blackburn,
more than two payments,
then the suspension is off and they can come after you
for the full arrearage.
I want to use
that as kind of a club to keep you making
these payments.
(R., pp. 41-42).
The court then reduced the total monthly obligation from
$250 to $200 and then stated the following:
And by doing it that way, then it would
make it $200 a month on the current and
nothing on the arrearage unless you get
behind. That will help Mrs. Black.burn also.
Plaintiff's attorney then asked if a judgment for the arrearage
would be entered.

The court then replied:

Oh yes.
You have your judgment for that
amount, but suspended any collection of it
as long as he is making payments.
If he
fails to make payments, then he is going to
face the consequences. Very well. That
will be the order.
(R., p. 42).
A judgment and order were entered on July 30, 1979.
pp. 27-28).
is taken.

(R.,

It is from this order and judgment that this appeal
(R., p. 31).
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
STAYING EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT INDEFINITELY AND SUCH ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED.

-3-
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Appellant will concede that the trial court is vested
with discretion in deciding numerous matters concerning the sut·
sequent modification of a divorce decree.

Appellant, for ex-

ample, does not dispute the trial court's order reducing the
monthly child support obligation based upon the circumstances
of the defendant at the time of the hearing.

Of course, Appel·

lant may later request this amount to be increased when Defendant's circumstances improve.

In any case, however, such a

decision rests with the discretion of the court.
However, the indefinite staying of the delinquent judgmen:
by the trial court was clearly an abuse of discretion.

This

Court has held that installments of alimony become vested when
they become due and that a court has no power to modify the de·
cree as to them.

In Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 19771

this Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to red'c'
accrued and unpaid alimony installments to judgment.
The court in this case effectively committed the same err::
as in the Bates case since effectively the judgment granted by
the court may never be enforceable assuming that the defendant
meets his present obligation.
The stay of execution in this case is particularly

dett~

. od of 1; ~i· tat ions upon a
mental in that the eight-year Perl.
~ ..
judgment applies to delinquent support.
684

(Utah 1975).

ti):.

Seeley v. Park, 5Jl f

Thus, at the termination of eight years pli;"

. ·c-·

tiff would have the burden of attempting to preserve any JU'
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ment existing against.the defendant and, under the court's order, would not even be entitled to the statutory interest which
would be applicable to a judgment which is in full force and
effect.
This court in a similar case has previously held that a
stay such as this is unwarranted.
312 P.2d 779

In Palmquist v. Palmquist,

(Utah 1957) a judgment was entered by the trial

court for a delinquency amount.

However the judgment also pro-

vided that execution should not issue on such judgment until
expiration of ten days after its entry to give the defendant
opportunity to commence an aceion against the plaintiff for alleged damages on a cause of action for withholding certain title papers on a horse.
Appellant claimed that the trial court erred in staying
execution on the judgment since there was no statutory or equitable grounds which justified the court's discretion.

This

Court noted that Rule 62(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court discretionary power to stay judgment but
this Court noted that some showing of circumstances must be contained in the record to justify such a stay.

As noted by this

Court:
We shall assume, however, that equitable
grounds for granting a stay of execution
may be invoked. See 33 C.J.S. Executions
Section 139, p. 313. We find none such
in this case. The defendant asserted that
he had an unliquidated claim for damages
for withholding of title papers to the
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horse.
Nothing further was shown.
That
he would be in any way irreparably injured
were execution to issue, that the defendant was insolvent, was about to depart
from the jurisdiction, or any other ground
except the bare assertion of an unliquidated claim does not appear.
Equitable relief from the enforcement of a
judgment is not granted on the grounds
that the parties have cross demands, merely,
but rather that some injustice would result
were execution not stayed.
Id. at 780.
In the Palmquist case this Court struck down a stay of
only ten days.

In the present case the stay granted by the

trial court could last indefinitely as long as Defendant does
not fall two payments behind in his support.

In addition,

Plaintiff is suffering a financial loss in that the stay of
the execution prevents the accrual of the statutory interest
which would otherwise be applicable against Defendant.
The record is void of any showing which would justify
a stay in this case.

The stay was granted entirely on the

court's own motion since no demand was sought by the defendant.
The only reason given by the trial court was that the stay
would act as "a kind of a club to keep you making these payments."

(R.

I

p. 42).

In effect, then, if Defendant maintains the obligation
which by court order he is required to do he is essentially for·
given of his past transgressions and Plaintiff is denied

t~
'c

opportunity to collect money which is rightfully due and owin,
to her.

The "club" which the trial court referred to shoU
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·

Defendant's fear of being held in contempt of court rather
than the incentive of allowing Defendant to escape an obligation of the past by maintaining a present obligation.
In conclusion, Appellant submits that there is no equitable or legal justification for the granting of this perpetual
stay and that an injustice is actually resulting against Plaintiff who is unable presently to seek collection of this past
amount or to even negotiate with Defendant as to how such amount
should be satisfied.

Under the present circumstances, moreover,

Defendant is given a lag period of two months of delinquency
before any penalty attaches.

Thus, as long as he is only 1-1/2

months behind his payments at any given time the suspension is
not vacated.

Such a lag obviously creates a hardship on the

part of Plaintiff who has no effective tool to require prompt
payment.
Finally, the court's order of stay places the expense and
burden upon Plaintiff to go back to court and to prove that a
delinquency of two months had occurred in order to vacate the
trial court's suspension.

Again, such a burden is an obvious

injustice and hardship upon the plaintiff who is the innocent
party in this dispute.
The order of the trial court in indefinitely suspending a
judgment based upon delinquent child support was clearly an abuse of discretion and a patently erroneous order.

For this

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reason, Appellant should be entitled to a reasonable attorney';
fee fof prosecution of this appeal.
706

Bates v. Bates, 560

(Utah 1977).
Respectfully submitted,
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